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The Bottom Billion by Paul Collier has raised a lot of attention in the world of 
development.  The heart of the narrative presented in the book is that a group of almost 
60 countries, with a population of about a billion people, are caught in four main traps.  
Their prospects for escaping the traps are poor, and they need a set of actions from the 
international community to achieve the rapid rates of growth that are argued to be 
necessary for poverty reduction.  In this paper, Dr. Randy Spence provides a critical 
analysis of the book.  The overall argument of this paper is that the analysis and 
narrative of the book need to be expanded in several ways to be of greater use to policy 
makers in the bottom billion (BB) countries, and to practitioners working on issues of 
global poverty and development.  Drawing on his extensive experience in applied 
development policy and research in several regions and countries, the author provides 
insights on expanding the perspective presented in The Bottom Billion and raises 
questions and suggestions for further investigation and analysis.  After reviewing the 
main perspectives presented in the book in greater detail, the paper looks at the concept 
of ‘traps’, and then at each of the four traps.  The paper then picks up the threads of 
several broader factors which emerge in the discussion of the traps.  Finally, a number of 
questions for further consideration are raised and a summary of suggestions to move 
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The Bottom Billion by Paul Collier is a book you have to think hard about while you are 
reading, and tend to think about afterwards.  The Bottom Billion draws together and 
extends a large number of research studies which Prof. Collier and colleagues have 
conducted over a long period, and weaves them into a narrative.  The heart of the 
narrative is that a group of almost 60 countries, with a population of about a billion 
people, are caught in four main traps.  Their prospects for escaping the traps are poor, 
and they need a set of actions from the international community to achieve the rapid 
rates of growth that are argued to be necessary for poverty reduction.  Such actions are 
in the interests of advanced countries for both humanitarian and long-term security 
reasons. 
 
The overall argument of this paper is that the analysis and narrative of the book need to 
be expanded in several ways to be of greater use to policy makers in the bottom billion 
(BB) countries, and those working on issues of global poverty and development. More 
specifically, the discussion and argument of the paper is developed in the following step-
wise fashion.  Section 2 reviews the main points of The Bottom Billion in greater detail.  
Section 3 looks at the concept of ‘traps,’ and then at each of the four traps – the conflict 
trap, the natural resource revenue trap, the governance trap and the landlocked (with 
bad neighbours) trap.  In each case, suggestions are made for expanding the 
perspective through which the traps are seen and the solutions proposed.  Section 4 
picks up the threads of several broader factors which emerge in the discussion of the 
traps.  For example, it is argued that the prospects of a better life for the poorest look 
quite different in the multi-polar world emerging from the fast growth of China, India and 
other exporters of manufactured goods.  Technologies are also changing the lives and 
prospects of people at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’.  Global warming, by contrast, is a 
major negative factor in the prospects of the poorest, but well designed international 
action can minimize this negative factor and turn it to the advantage of the BB countries.  
Section 5 raises a number of questions for further consideration and analysis, and 
provides a summary of suggested policy and research priorities that differ from those of 
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The Bottom Billion.  This section first looks at the many sources of growth and 
development, moving beyond manufactured exports.  It also examines the relationship 
between economic growth, and development of the capacities of a society to generate 
and manage market, non-profit and public sector activities.  It draws out lessons from 
experiences on capacity development and examines development approaches and 
objectives not solely focused on GDP growth.  Finally, it re-examines aid priorities in light 
of this discussion, and considers the likelihood or naivety of various recommendations for 
international action stemming from The Bottom Billion or the discussion in this paper. 
 
What follows is the perspective of an economist with extensive experience in applied 
development.  I have notably worked in ministries of finance and planning (Tanzania, 
Kenya, Uganda, and Canada) as well as developed and managed policy research 
programs with governments and other stakeholders in Asia.  Most of this work focused 
on economic policy, Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), and other 
technologies. Other experiences have included energy policy and university economics 
teaching in Canada.  Throughout my career, learning from my colleagues has been 





The ‘bottom billion’ (BB) people refers to everyone living in a group of 58 bottom 
countries: most of Africa, Haiti, Bolivia, Yemen, Central Asian countries, Laos, 
Cambodia, Burma and North Korea.  In the book, Prof. Collier argues that these 
countries are caught in one or more of four traps: the conflict trap, the natural resource 
revenue trap, the governance trap and the landlocked (with bad neighbours) trap.  These 
countries have missed the fast growth boat that globalization has provided over the past 
two to three decades to other developing countries, especially Asian countries, to export 
manufactured products to global consumer markets on the basis of their low-wage 
labour.  The author suggests that there will not be other such boats soon.  The prospects 
for development of these countries are bad, and their problems are everyone’s problems, 
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for security let alone humanitarian reasons.  What can be done to help these countries 
develop involves the use of best instruments for each trap, the main instruments being 
aid, military intervention, laws and charters, and trade policy.  More specifically, some 
main options and proposals are: 
• Conflict trap: Continued improvement of aid and (long term) peacekeeping in 
post-conflict situations, and an international charter on post-conflict 
governance. 
• Natural resource revenue trap: An international charter for resource wealth; 
something like a revised version of the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative. 
• Governance trap: With intervention in failed states largely discredited by Iraq 
et al. – charters and norms on international democracy and on budget 
transparency. 
• Landlocked trap: Aid on a substantial scale, and with strong management by 
donors in countries with debilitated governance - plus aid to neighbours for 
transport corridors. 
 
For countries trying to break out of limbo, an international charter on investment is 
needed to start domestic and foreign investment flowing, as is trade protection with 
respect to more advanced developing countries (in Asia) to put their low-labour cost 
manufactures on a competitive footing.  In general, aid agencies should improve their 
programming and focus on the most difficult environments where their support is the 
most needed.  Peacekeeping capability and decision making should be built by both 
developed and developing countries.  Moreover, key international charters and trade 
protection measures should be promulgated using existing channels for the most part. 
Such international charters include the following:  
• Charter for natural resource revenue  
• Charter for budget transparency  
• Charter for post-conflict situations 
• Charter for investment 
• Charter for democracy 
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Coordination and focus problems among donors will be stiff; in particular getting 
government agencies to work together within developed countries and across the global 
system. 
 
A lot of the insights provided in the Bottom Billon are innovative, useful and sometimes 
familiar in light of a career of applied development policy and research.  The identification 
of the four traps is itself an innovation, together with careful analysis of their sub-
components (for example, how coups are different from civil wars) and inter-relationships 
– how they reinforce or counter each other in particular countries - in light of very 
persistent statistical and econometric research.  The result on the one hand is a 
framework for better understanding the state and challenges of each of the 58 BB 
countries, and on the other hand, a basis for ‘aggregating’ broader solutions in aid, 
peacekeeping, international norms and trade policy. 
 
The resource trap is not yet widely enough digested in the many facets of international 
development, and Paul Collier, Tony Venables and others have been at the forefront of 
its analysis.  Resources range from (blood) diamonds and jewels, to minerals, forests, 
petroleum and many others.  Resource revenues can induce problems such as the 
malfunctioning of democracy and conflict over the revenues, boom-bust instability, and 
the Dutch disease which occurs when a country’s currency appreciates due to foreign 
sales of its resources, which in turn makes it harder to diversify the economy and 
compete in low-cost manufactures.  How to manage resource revenues well is 
reasonably well understood by experts and practitioners in countries that do it well.  
Resources are, however, unlikely to be managed well in the BB countries, which are 
often trapped in various cycle of instability, conflict, non-competitiveness in other exports, 
and governance snares. 
 
Many specific perspectives and research findings presented in The Bottom Billion 
correspond with my personal experience (see Box 1).  Some of them are contentious 
because of debates about causality.  Do low income and slow growth cause civil wars, or 
do civil wars cause low income and slow growth?  These questions have been examined 
in depth by a number of researchers and reviewers.  This paper will thus not directly 
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address such questions, but will rather focus on expanding the perspectives provided in 
the book.  
 
Box 1: Main Perspectives and Research Findings Presented in the Bottom Billion  
• 73% of people in the BB have recently been in a civil war or are in one. 
• Civil war is more likely to occur in countries with low income, slow growth/stagnation/decline, 
dependence on primary resource exports (oil, diamonds, etc.) - and is not statistically related to 
measures of political repression, ethnic strife or colonization experience. 
• Civil wars re-start and get ‘institutionalized’, and military spending stays high; the immediate post-
conflict period is a critical time for intervention and assistance. 
• As demonstrated by De Beers and the Kimberly Process for the certification of diamonds, big 
companies can be a key part of the solution rather than being part of the problem. 
• The cost of a typical civil war to the country and its neighbours can be put at about $64 billion. 
• Coups are more likely to occur in countries with low or slow growth and where there have been prior 
coups. 
• Democracy undermines a country’s ability to harness resource surpluses, especially in countries 
with close electoral competition; the resource revenue trap tends to generate a political 
development trap and checks and balances are more important than electoral democracy. 
• Growth (and decline) spills over very substantially from neighbours to landlocked countries. 
• Being resource poor and landlocked is dismal.  Some strategies include increasing neighbourhood 
growth spillovers, improving economic policies, facilitating coastal access, becoming a haven for the 
region, not being air-locked or e-locked, encouraging remittances, fostering rural development, 
trying to attract aid, and creating a transparent investment-friendly environment for resource 
prospecting. 
• Starting from being a failed state, a country is more likely to sustain a turnaround: the larger is its 
population, the higher is the % of population having secondary education, and whether the country 
recently emerged from a civil war. 
• The expected time before a failing state achieves decisive change is fifty-nine years. 
• The cost of a single failing state over its entire history of failure, to itself and its neighbours, is 
around $100 billion. 
• Capital outflows are as important as lack of capital inflows to the BB – by 1990, 38% of Africa’s 
private wealth was held abroad. 
• Migration can help, but BB countries have fewer qualified lower-skilled emigrants, and lose more of 
the domestically key high-skilled. 
• Aid can fuel conflict traps and contributes to the Dutch disease, but overall, despite the bureaucracy, 
aid has been much more successful than oil as a source of development finance. 
• Aid policy conditionality fails for reasons of condescension and time inconsistency (ease of breaking 
promises); aid governance conditionality (for domestic accountability) may succeed. 
• During reform, technical assistance packages of $250 million per year are justified and have an 
expected payoff of about $15 billion. 
• Budget support is appropriate for reasonably well governed BB countries, but well managed ‘hands 
on’ aid is needed for the substantial majority of others. 
• Aid significantly reduces capital flight and aid worsens the problem of trade barriers. 
• Developed country trade protection (agriculture) damages the BB as do their own trade barriers.  
Some options include regional integration (but not behind high trade barriers), export diversification, 
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3-Some Thoughts on the Traps 
 
Focusing on the BB, in terms of countries rather than people, is a choice Prof. Collier 
made, and one that makes a lot of sense.  The world operates in terms of countries, and 
everyone in these 58 is in jeopardy or (much) worse.  It may still be worth keeping in 
mind that the majority of the world’s poor are in Asia, and in countries NOT in the BB 
group.  They are poor within societies that are now growing and developing.  One may 
not be as concerned about them because their countries are, or are becoming, in a 
position to do something about their plight, or because it is less politically feasible to 
intervene in favour of the poor minorities living in countries that are progressing.  One 
may also think that they are not as likely as their counterparts in the BB countries to 
mount security and terrorist threats.  Yet, there are some striking counter-examples. 
 
Do any or all of the same traps apply to the poor living in non-BB countries, that is, the 
other bottom billion (OBB) populations?  Many empirical questions arise.  My experience 
says probably yes, but with different factors.  For instance, rebels in Mindanao and 
Southern Thailand may be involved in conflict and resource revenue traps, and stagnant 
governance or political development.  There are many cases and faces of the problem of 
poor or trapped minorities, religious states providing one whole set of countries which, by 
self-definition, discriminates against minorities - Nepalese in Bhutan, Palestinians within 
Israel, anyone who renounces Islam in Iran.  There are, however, few religious states 
among the BB countries. 
 
How do growth and average income compare in the BB and OBB?  In some cases in the 
OBB, poverty may be more relative than absolute, but may also be experienced with 
equal resentment or anger.  How we look at well-being and poverty is important.  Poor 
people will often say that they are happy if this year is a little better than the previous 
one.  By contrast, the biggest single health problem in the North is depression, and the 
biggest preoccupation security.  Our preferences and expectations adapt to where we 
are now, and we use this as a benchmark for future changes in our well-being.  Material 
well-being is not the whole story, yet most people would agree that there are minimum 
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adequate levels of nutrition, health, education and security.  Lack of security, dignity and 
empowerment are greater plights in the BB countries, and for OBB people too, than in 
developed countries, though of course they are present there too. 
 
It might be interesting to look at income and growth in the poor populations within OBB 
countries and perhaps, in some of them, look at the terms of trade between OBB 
enclaves and their more affluent countrymen and women.  Can there be elements of 
Dutch disease within a country, even with a fixed internal exchange rate?  Does the 
selling of resources by OBB enclaves undermine their ability to compete in the 
mainstream national economy?  Are their traps or serious problems that condemn large 
numbers in advancing countries to poverty?  Is their poverty going to be temporary, 
gradually eliminated by growth, and are they thus not just caught in the inevitable period 
of declining equity that accompanies fast growth and major technology change?  Do the 
wealthier get the benefits first and foremost, and the rest benefit as growth and 
technology get diffused?  Or are there also – as in the BB – systemic traps with their 
determining factors to address and change?  
 
Put another way, a significant percentage of the population in BB countries enjoys 
European levels of income.  Is that percentage higher in OBB enclaves? Moreover, in 
the richest countries, a significant percentage of the population lives in relative and even 
absolute poverty.  What is trapping the poor and what are the common elements across 
poorer-to-richer countries?  Can economic growth be sufficient for ending their poverty?  
Furthermore, is ’trap‘ really a good word for serious problems and constraints?  When 
does a serious problem become a trap?  Is HIV/AIDS, which gets one passing reference 
in The Bottom Billion, a serious problem or a trap? 
 
3.1-The Conflict Trap 
 
The analysis and conclusions presented in the book with respect to the conflict trap are 
appealing, including suggestions regarding the continued improvement of aid and (long 
term) peacekeeping in post conflict situations as well as the development of an 
international charter on post-conflict governance.  The building of professional 
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international and regional peacekeeping forces, to be credible, will require  unseen levels 
of military and political cooperation across a wide range of countries. Yet, a LOT could 
be done with a change in the main current global polarizations, and with a fraction of the 
resources spent on current military conflicts and interventions.  There is at least a little 
room for optimism.  A post-conflict charter is needed, and there is plenty of basis for it in 
the excellent work of many countries, donors and international organizations.  In fact, 
there are some important pieces in place in the United Nations (UN).1 
 
The way in which the conflict (C), resource (R) and governance (G) traps interact is very 
important, and has many variations in different countries.  At any point in time in a 
country, there can be 8 cases:  CRG, CR, CG, RG, C, R, G, none. 2   Add to this that 
each trap can start and stop in ways related to the other traps and it becomes very 
difficult to define a clear set of policies for each case.  Alternatively, as Prof. Collier 
seems to suggest, it is reasonable to follow all the main proposals made, not just one or 
two, and to fine tune the instruments to the countries as their situations change.  Thus, 
all of the following policies (in particular) go together as a basic set for BB countries: 
• improvement of aid and technical assistance (especially for landlocked 
countries, including aid to neighbours for building transportation corridors) 
• improvement of sustained peacekeeping 
• international charter on post-conflict governance 
• international charter for resource wealth 
• international democracy and budget transparency charters 
• international charter on investment 
• special trade protection / treatment  
 
Some elements are clearly missing.  Something has to be said about international arms 
production and trade.  It may be my imagination, but there seems to be quite a wide 
                                            
1 See, for example, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 
(2005) and other general, regional and country resolutions of the UN Security Council (available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/index.html).  
2 This is setting aside the landlocked trap as, for the most part, one has usually no choice about being 
landlocked (though the bad or good neighbors can change), and being landlocked makes everything else 
harder.  If the trap of being landlocked is added into the mix, there are 15 possible combinations of traps. 
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conspiracy of silence on this front.  Everyday, millions of people get up in Oxford where 
Prof. Collier lives, Toronto where I live, Europe, China, Russia and notably America - still 
the world’s largest arms producer and exporter – and go to work making weapons that 
blow people up or blow people away or blow their limbs off in distant parts of the world.  
One could argue that people – not guns – kill people or that if we do not arm the good 
guys, our enemies will keep arming the villains, or that if the more advanced countries 
stop exporting arms, their production will just be taken up elsewhere.  However, these 
are little more than dodges, and it seems clear that a) international arms production and 
trade is a huge global industry that does not care at all about people anywhere, and b) 
without it, people might still fight it out with knives and machetes, but prospects would be 
a LOT different and better without all the hardware.   
 
If there is a case for new international charters, this certainly has to be a prime candidate 
from the perspective of need.  Probability?  Probably low, but asking all the ministries of 
Northern governments to work together on aid, trade, military intervention and other 
charters strikes me as no more or less ‘heroic’ than asking for agreement on widespread 
arms reduction, where production is done and condoned by precisely these same 
governments.  Global arms trade will remain a huge black mark on human history as 
long as it is done on this massive scale, practiced and protected by the powerful 
countries. 
 
3.2-The Natural Resource Revenue Trap 
 
The work of Prof. Paul Collier and his colleagues on the pitfalls and principles of 
resource revenue management has been valuable.3  The Commission on Growth and 
Development4 may have interesting things to say here too.  My understanding is not 
complete, but principles of good resource revenue management would I think include, 
where feasible, the following: 1) establishing a transparent public royalty at a level which 
is low enough to stimulate production and export but keeps the rest for the public purse, 
                                            
3 The new Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource-Rich Economies continues this tradition. 
4 The main report of the Commission was launched on May 21, 2008.  For more information, see 
http://www.growthcommission.org/ . 
 
2) the use of the public royalty for public investment especially in infrastructure, 
education and health, and 3) ‘sterilizing’ revenues as needed – parking them in good 
financial markets/instruments offshore, and bringing them in as fast as good investment 
projects are developed.  This set of policies should minimize the Dutch disease effect of 
resource export revenues and build market capital, infrastructure and human capabilities. 
 
The problem often – and more so in the BB countries – is getting anything like this going; 
moving from governance by theft to a serious development path.  A charter would indeed 
be very helpful, and the Kimberly Process suggests that major global resource industry 
players might be involved in, and might comply with international norms.  A serious look 
at possibilities for a similar kind of charter in each key resource sector sounds like a good 
idea – petroleum, gems, minerals and timber.  Are there any sectors which would be 
particularly problematic in terms of patterns of foreign involvement and domestic 
management, i.e. where one or more of the central domestic and foreign interests are 
now willing to be governed by principles of good behaviour?  Will British and American 
companies agree to behave? Will China and Chinese companies cooperate, not to 
mention the other fast-boaters of the developing world? 
 
Cambodia’s gross domestic product (GDP) is growing rapidly at around 5-6% per year.  
On a recent visit, I was told that ‘everything is being sold’.  Cambodia’s growth is notably 
associated with considerable resource revenue from jewels, timber, bauxite, minerals, 
and even fish - and petroleum revenues are just around the corner.  There is no 
transparency in the management of revenues, and no one expects anything different 
with petroleum.  A lot of Cambodians would like this lack of transparency to change.  
New international norms, whether or not the Cambodian Government subscribes to 
them, would provide an important basis for concerned Cambodians, and those who 
would assist them, to make demands to their government.  If there were a charter, 
developed country governments and oil companies would need to comply with it and 
would be required to be transparent about their international dealings.  This is a very 
appealing prospect for change, but also a huge leap ahead of current practices. 
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What about coffee, tea, wine – even fruit, vegetables and flowers?  These agricultural 
products are essentially natural resources and come from specific climates and 
geographical regions – if not from specific locations like oil and metals.  In addition, their 
production and export have been promoted heavily in many BB countries and by major 
donors – with many successes.  They thus serve to raise a range of questions about 
agriculture and ‘resources’.  In particular, why do not we look at agriculture like other 
natural resource industries?  Forest industries and timber production are close in nature 
to agriculture, and are usually seen as natural resources.  Timber exports have been a 
resource revenue trap in many countries, like petroleum, due to governance by theft and 
relative ease of export in raw form to willing buyers.  Biological (e.g. pharmaceutical) 
resources have strong resource-trap characteristics, and international charters and 
norms are relatively well debated and developed in these areas, if not always followed by 
BB villains and hungry bio-prospecting multinationals from West and East. 
 
Unlike timber, and more akin to petroleum or base metals, exporting beverages (tea, 
coffee, wine, etc.) and horticulture products typically requires relatively advanced 
production and export capabilities as well as international connections.  They represent 
important sources of growth and comparative advantage for many developing countries.  
Although they may be less prone to outright mismanagement than the more ‘footloose’ 
resources like timber and precious metals, they are not immune and there appears to be 
resource-trap elements in their mismanagement, particularly in those BB countries where 
governance by theft is entrenched. 
 
Discussion often tends to skirt around agriculture as a source of growth for developing 
and BB countries because agricultural trade protection is such a blot on the face of the 
global economy.  Agriculture is a rare sector – the others being mostly other natural 
resources sectors – in which the bottom countries often have a potential comparative 
advantage.  So why do BB countries not export more agricultural products?  Indeed, BB 
countries have comparative advantages in agriculture and natural resource industries 
stemming from their cheap labour and their endowments in natural resources.  They also 
have a potential comparative advantage in producing manufactured goods and ‘mobile’ 
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labour-intensive services.  Do BB countries lack capacities to take advantage of the 
comparative advantages which stem from land and low-cost labour? 
 
One could argue that specialization and increased exports do not occur much in 
agriculture because this is the one sector which the advanced market economies 
tenaciously protect.  Countries of Europe and America, in particular, sacrifice a lot of 
national and global welfare to protect their farmers, and perhaps to protect their food 
security.  This is a central ongoing public debacle of international development, making it 
very easy for the North to be accused of hypocrisy in other areas, and it is currently very 
unclear how and when U.S. and European agricultural protection may be reduced and 
eliminated.  Nor is it clear exactly what would happen.  Food exports of developing 
countries should expand a lot, particularly for those able to meet international standards 
in a growing number of areas - sanitary and phyto-sanitary (health and hygiene), 
environmental, fairness and other characteristics that consumers are likely to 
increasingly care about and demand. 
 
While relative food prices should eventually decline, with efficiency increases in global 
food production and trade, they tend to rise initially.  Is it also noteworthy that food prices 
are rising from rapidly growing demand from China, India and the whole group of 
countries that caught the fast manufactured-exports boats.  The current generation of 
leaders in China still includes many who experienced famines in their younger days, and 
food storage in China is very high by international comparison. However, new needs 
from fast growth are driving food and other resource imports up anyway.  The same 
pattern looks likely for India, but in a different form.  There is an element in Indian 
development thinking which foresees a large productive agricultural sector in the future.  
All prior international experiences suggest that it will be small, but the pursuit of ‘learning 
and changing villages’ is deeply rooted in Indian policy and philanthropy.   
 
Some of the net losers from reduced Northern agricultural production, according to 
almost everyone’s modelling, would be BB countries importing food, and the current 
world food prices crisis provides a stern reminder of the consequences of unaffordable 
food for poorer people. 
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Some of the winners among agricultural producers and exporters should also be in the 
BB countries, but less so than other countries until they improve their transport and 
certification infrastructure.  Many BB countries have done this in the sectors that are not 
protected in the North, including large scale exports of coffee and tea as well as 
horticulture and flowers.  Increased productivity in the agricultural sector is certainly 
possible with investment from domestic and foreign partners.  Agricultural development 
and export should be easier then for manufacturing production because BB countries 
start with much existing production capacity in agriculture and almost none in 
manufacturing production and export.  Could agriculture be globalization’s next fast 
boat?  No, not that fast.  Food demand, unlike consumer goods demand, tends to grow 
less quickly than income. More importantly, labour productivity in agriculture is much 
lower than in manufacturing production - it is thus the moving of people from agriculture 
to manufactures or services which is itself a major part of fast-growth phenomena like 
China. 
 
However, even slower boats are very important for BB countries.  Could the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries summon the political will 
to dismantle their agricultural protection while at the same time being hit by job loss in 
manufactures?  Or is global food demand going to rise fast enough to support current or 
near-current food production levels even in the North?   Investment advisors and 
acquaintances tell me that Canada’s comparative advantage is shifting back towards 
resources, and that food is a hot industry into at least the medium term. 
 
If agricultural production and exports grow in BB countries, who will gain from it?  
Research and theory suggest that increases in agricultural productivity, where there is 
competition on the production side, mostly benefit consumers.  Developing countries and 
BB producers may benefit very little or even lose ground on prices and profit margins, but 
are likely to gain a lot on volume - like the case with manufactured exports.  ‘Producers’ 
include transport and marketing systems as well as farmers.  Farmers will benefit less 
where intermediary controls are numerous and competition is restricted.  However, 
communication innovations are gradually facilitating competition and the ability of 
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producers to sell directly to a range of buyers in many parts of the world, including in 
some BB countries.   
 
In short, in spite of needed cautions and the large ongoing changes in technology and 
structure in the global food sector, it seems likely that growing food demand from the fast 
boaters, and the eventual end of agricultural protectionism in the North, could provide an 
alternative yacht for a lot of countries - not as fast a boat as manufactured exports, but a 
boat is a boat.  A clear lesson drawn from The Bottom Billion and a career in applied 
development policy and research is that it is more important to be going in the right 
direction than to be going fast. 
 
I would have to add agricultural protection and trade explicitly to the list of international 
charters that are needed.  Such a charter of course exists in the form of the WTO and its 
principles, but it is just not applied and followed in agriculture.  In addition, I would 
advance the suggestion of providing special assistance to BB countries to help them 
develop agricultural export infrastructure and investment relationships with foreign 
markets - companies and countries in the global food and resource sectors. 
 
The natural resource revenue trap may also highlight two more broad sets of questions 
relating to sectoral sources of growth.  First, are manufactured exports really the only fast 
boat?  They have not always been.  In fact, there are no historical fast boats up to about 
the 1950s.  However, manufactured exports have recently been, in the past few decades 
of rapid globalization, almost the only fast boats.  What can a country do if this boat is far 
from visiting its shores?  What about resource and agricultural exports?  How are 
comparative advantages shifting globally and where will the currently ‘developed’ 
countries come out?  What about non-export sources of growth in the BB countries - 
domestic or non-traded food products, manufactures and services - which typically 
account for 90% or more of a market economy?5  Realistically, given that these may be 
                                            
5 Even China has an export share of only 10%.  The Economist (January 5-11, 2008) points out that this is 
very different from the ‘headline’ share of 30% or so, but the headline ratio is incorrect in using nominal 
(exports) and value added (GDP) measures in the same fraction.  The ratio of nominal measures, or of 
value added measures, both give export shares of about 10%. 
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the only options for some countries for some time, even if Prof. Collier’s 
recommendations were all acted upon, what are the prospects and best ways of 
pursuing them?  
 
As a corollary, are fast boats the best boats?  In the area of natural resources, the 
nutritional value of diets goes down with fast growth.  The quality of food and the quality 
of growth also matter.  One can argue that poor people mainly want growth – more food, 
medicines, consumer goods, etc.  However, while there is much truth to this, fast growth 
is not what I have heard people in BB countries taking about; people care more about 
steady growth, together with security, kids going to school, being able to live without 
oppression, that is, their capabilities and freedoms.  People who advocate that 
development should focus mainly on growth argue that more capabilities and freedoms 
come mainly from more income.  As argued below, there is partial truth to this, but 
income growth also depends on growing capabilities; it is more like a two-way street. 
 
Furthermore, what is actually happening at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ (BoP) in the BB 
and OBB countries?  Is “the fortune at the bottom of the pyramid eradicating poverty 
through profits” (C.K. Prahalad 2006)?  Frankly, yes!  There are large changes going on 
in some BB and OBB countries in terms of expansion of markets and services at the BoP 
– for instance, microfinance and insurance are now managed by mobile phone.  
Moreover, personal security is going up because of networking.  Pretty much the whole 
range of economic services is beginning to emerge – finance, insurance, marketing and 
distribution (farmers and fishers connecting with markets, reduced middleman margins), 
employment services (drivers, casual workers), personal services, public telehealth and 
education services.6  These developments are quite new but look important and have a 
lot to do with the predicted diffusion of ICTs, a key globalization driver and knowledge 
carrier deserving more attention and analysis in general, and in the BB countries in 
particular. 
                                            
6 For more information on these new developments, please consult the work of LIRNEasia on ‘Teleuse at the 
bottom of the pyramid,’ (available at http://www.lirneasia.net/projects/), of Research ICT Africa (RIA) on e-
use across Africa (available at http://www.researchictafrica.net/) and of the Dialogo Regional sobre 
Sociedad de la Informacion (DIRSI), on ‘Mobile Opportunities: Poverty and Telephony Access in Latin 
America and the Caribbean’ (available at http://www.dirsi.net/english/). 
 
3.3-The Governance Trap 
 
Bad governance can take many forms.  From the book and my experience, there are a 
few main dimensions that might be suggested.  Main dimensions of governance traps, 
for example, might be usefully explored along the following axes:  
1. well-motivated / corrupt 
2. military / non-military 
3. politically cohesive / fragmented 
4. competent / incompetent 
 
A country may have problems in none, some or all dimensions; the number of 
variations being 15.  A few examples may illustrate such variations. 
 
Burma is a country that was and should be doing very well economically. The country is 
a rice bowl perched between South and East Asia with an educated population and a 
reasonably good government up to the 1980s.  However, Burma is today in the multiple 
governance traps of being completely military, quite corrupt and no longer very 
competent, with university and other education systems also having fallen slowly apart 
due to a lack of resources and outside contact.  This is a particularly difficult variation to 
change – to attain well motivated, non-military, and competent – because the military is 
at great risk with change.  Unlike Iraq, Burma was and is potentially quite politically and 
culturally unified, with only small minorities.  Here, there is a strong case for concerted 
foreign pressure, but in this case it appears to be mostly up to China, with internal 
opposition and any other foreign support, to bring about regime change.  Test case for 
China, with the world watching. 
 
Kenya is at a crossroads, a crucial moment, with a government that has been non-
military and quite competent since independence, but also quite corrupt and with the 
potential for political disunity lurking in the Kikuyu ‘majority without plurality’.  With 18 
tribes, Tanzania has it easier, curiously, as none of its 18 ethnic groups is highly 
dominant.  A peaceful and non-military solution in Kenya is so desirable relative to civil 
war or the state failing – at a cost of $65 - $100 billion as estimated by Prof. Collier – that 
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nothing could be better than negotiation and settlement.  Kenya is perhaps the perfect 
example of the political development trap set out in The Bottom Billion.  A close, but 
unstable, electoral balance among groups was held together by corrupt politics and a 
relatively good civil service.  Now that the balance has tipped, checks and balances - in 
fact a coalition government of checks and balances – is now as crucial as fair elections 
for the coming years.   
 
The Bottom Billion often speaks of villains and heroes, and governance traps of many 
varieties are a reminder that there are villains and heroes at the centre of power and also 
all throughout the system. Aung San Suu Kyi is a hero who may yet again lead a 
democratic country.  Voices close to the Chinese leadership, or Burmese generals, could 
be decisive - as could voices close to Kibaki and Raila Odinga in Kenya.  People in and 
around positions of power face risks, persecution, and sometimes death when pushing 
for change.  If change starts, and when growth and development are taking place, what 
seems to matter is what the government can deliver (competence), and how broad, 
effective and enduring is the national coalition (political cohesiveness). 
 
The requirements for achieving a growth spurt are not the same as those for 
sustaining growth and development.  The latter have more to do with the 
development of capabilities of individuals, institutions, processes and systems in private, 




In Uganda, at the end of the civil war in 1986 and 1987, two Ugandan economists were 
particularly crucial in essentially re-booting the economy.  One was a Professor at 
Makerere University who had managed to keep teaching (and learning) through the civil 
war, and the other was a recent graduate of the University of Chicago who had been 
funded by a well respected American religious group with foresight.   They were heroes 
in those critical emerging-from-war moments, and people that were and are absolutely 
needed.  So were many of the people working in what remained of the central bank and 
government, who had kids to send to school and had wanted peace and progress for 
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over a decade, people that were and are absolutely needed.  So were a lot of other 
Ugandans who had kept their decency and faith in the future intact. 
 
Political cohesiveness 
We tend to think about democracy in relation to traps, as The Bottom Billion does, but 
there is also a large body of knowledge in the area of social justice and social choice – 
how societies do and can best get the services and other outcomes they share, and so 
have to achieve collectively.  Welfare economics7 has a lot to offer in terms of tools to 
assess efficiency and equity of public goods and services provision, but cannot posit a 
system to do it.  Markets work efficiently for private goods and services because they are 
sold to individuals, so producers know what each person wants.  Public services are in 
part consumed collectively – justice, security, education, health – some more than 
others.  Governments do not know day by day what people want, and with collectively 
consumed services, there is no optimal set to provide, except in the unlikely event that 
everyone agrees on everything.  In the private market segment of the economy, typically 
¾ of the total economy, markets can be very efficient in filling demand because sellers 
continuously know what buyers want.  In the public sector, which is much smaller but 
nevertheless also crucial, there is no such market mechanism.   
 
Cost-benefit analysis and other welfare-related tools are widely used for micro decisions 
faced by governments and they are valuable.  However, good public sector performance 
requires more than analytical tools; missing in emphasis by outsiders, and in teaching 
and practice in the BB countries, is building the capabilities, systems and institutions of 
government - and knowledge about justice and social choice, federalism, the means of 
managing opposing political interests and what really matters in constitutions.  The 
building up of the efficient processes and institutions of government is an essential 
element of development and growth. 
                                            
7 I use this term, as it has been used in the post-war period, to refer to a body of economic theory which 
addresses maximizing the welfare of a society and its individuals - welfare derived from consumption of 
goods and services. It includes theory better known as ‘neoclassical,’ ‘orthodox’ or even’ micro’ economics 
– and public finance for collectively consumed goods and services.  Foundations of Economic Analysis by 
Paul Samuelson and Public Finance in Theory and Practice by Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. are 
seminal treatments.   
 
 
South Africa’s constitution, for example, looks to have got a lot right, in being explicit 
about freedoms, and will hopefully withstand current political storm clouds.  Canada’s 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms is proving to be a very positive part of political 
cohesiveness.  All this range of knowledge is now taught in economics and social 
sciences in the North, and it is time that it be brought more into the mainstream in the 
South - particularly in the BB countries where governance is most problematic.  The 
African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), which Prof. Collier and I have served, 
is one ideal place to start, as it funds collaborative Economics masters and doctoral 
programs across the continent. 
 
Welfare economics is not by itself a sufficient basis for economic or overall 
governance and public policy, but it remains a vitally important part.  Borrowing 
from some current thinking on development and growth, development is the expansion of 
what a society is able to do; individuals, systems and institutions that know how to do 
things - build and sustain markets and enterprises of all sizes, governments of all levels, 
non-profit and civil organizations.  These capabilities take decades to build, but only 
years to unravel; development is asymmetrical, up and down.  All sectors need 
capable people everywhere.  Individual and group capabilities increasingly reside in and 
are reinforced by networks.  Economic growth is measured as the increase in production 
and consumption of goods and services by all of the sectors of the economy - typically 
60-70% market, 5-15% non-profit and 20-25% government.  Private sector growth is 
the lion’s share of economic growth. 
 
The more important government functions for growth, beyond avoiding conflict and 
corruption, are articulating and implementing economic and regulatory policies, that is, 
monetary, fiscal, trade and investment policies, and sectoral regulations.  Over time, of 
course, public spending and investment are also key to growth, particularly infrastructure, 
education and health.  However, none of these key policy functions will be done well 
without capable people and institutions, and the same is true in the private and non-profit 
sectors, including informal sectors that make up typically ¾ or more of an economy.   
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In short, there is no such thing as disembodied growth.  It was no accident that the fast 
manufactured export boats landed in East Asian ports.  Their governments were 
investing heavily in education and health.  It is fair to argue that market growth is needed 
much, and needed early - and that it enables necessary human and institutional 
developments to take place.  It is, however, also simple observation that human 
development is necessary for growth and enables growth.  There has been a long 
debate about how necessary and how sufficient is growth in the picture of development.  
My experience suggests that growth and capability development are both necessary 
parts of development, depending on and feeding each other.   
 
Not that economic growth has been over-emphasized, but it has been emphasized by 
multilateral and bilateral donors and others, including much of the economics profession, 
at the expense of human development and system or capability building.  Both are 
necessary and both could easily have been pursued in the BB countries and the 
developing world, integrally, as they are in many advanced countries.  The BB would 
likely be in appreciably better shape if the emphasis on education and health of the 
1970s had been sustained to the present, and that holds for the future too.  In an 
increasingly multi-polar world economy, where all societies will need to both create and 
adjust to comparative advantages, challenges of building and growing will be substantial.  
Europe and North America may become classic International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
cases, having to dismantle agricultural protection because the efficiency loss is eroding 
their competitiveness in manufacturing, technology and services.  Welfare economics, 
the capability approach and other frameworks can be priceless, forgive the term, in 
avoiding big mistakes and economic losses in a positive-sum but highly competitive 
global economy. 
 
3.4-The Landlocked with Bad Neighbours Trap 
 
In this area, the analysis and strategies put forward in The Bottom Billion are clear, and 
the strategies resonate with my experience of countries including Uganda, Laos and 
Mongolia. These strategies include aid and technical assistance on a substantial scale, 
aid to neighbours for transport corridors, and a set of strategies to improve economic 
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policies, improve coastal access, become a haven for the region, avoid being air-locked 
or e-locked, encourage remittances, pursue rural development and create an 
investment-friendly environment. 
 
Rural development may merit more attention, along with ‘bottom of the pyramid’ (BoP) 
enterprise and services development, which is both urban and rural.  All economic 
opportunities are important.  For instance, Uganda is rich in agriculture and should be 
expanding exports of plants, flowers, food, food products, coffee, etc.  Food processing 
has also been one of the solid sectors of development in many countries, and is needed 
to some degree just to meet export standards and engage in international markets.  
Uganda, among others, is also doing well in terms of ICT access and local BoP market 
and services development.  Another example is the quiet local development revolution 
going on in the Philippines, with major improvements in many dimensions of well-being 
(education, health, security), led by both communities and local governments, and 
typically preceding market and income growth. 
 
Prof. Collier’s point about regional integration may be particularly important to the 
landlocked-trapped countries - integration can generate economic benefits, but will not if 
it is done behind high collective trade barriers.  Experience also suggests that the 
processes of regional integration are needed parts of the building of systems and 
institutions.  For example, in the Canada-U.S. free trade discussions before the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Canada’s main motive - next to securing 
access to U.S. markets - was to constrain its own bureaucracies from economically 
wasteful industrial policy interventions.  Regional arrangements can be good for national 
economic policy making.  Other regional institutions will also be important to strengthen; 
for example, the Nile Basin Authority will come under enormous pressure with global 
warming and probable conflict over water use.  Global warming is mentioned again 
below because global warming will harm the BB people unless alternatives are 
consciously designed and implemented to do the opposite.  As elaborated below, a 
globally or widely agreed system of carbon credits is one approach which could be both 
efficient and equitable.  
 
IDRC GGP Working Paper Series    I 21  I     Paper#5: Randy Spence 
 
 
IDRC GGP Working Paper Series    I 22  I     Paper#5: Randy Spence 
 
4-Picking up the Threads 
 
4.1-A more multi-polar World 
 
China and India face challenges, but will likely continue to grow relatively rapidly for the 
foreseeable future.  China is on the domestic and manufactured export fast boat, indeed 
the major yacht in this class.  China is one of few major economies not protecting 
agriculture through tariffs and subsidies.  However, running an artificially low exchange 
rate both boosts manufactured exports and discourages agricultural imports.  Pressure is 
mounting for China to take its foot a little off the urbanization/manufacturing accelerator, 
but this will be resisted as much as possible by China.  It is a good strategy, running a 
large trade surplus and lending the reserves back to the U.S. and Europe so that they 
can buy more imports.  It may be an interesting question whether or not smaller 
economies could do something similar.  Job loss in manufacturing currently fuels 
protectionism in the West, but the West’s financial systems rely increasingly on flows 
from China, Asia and the fast boaters. 8  Overall, you might bet that China will continue 
its penetration of global manufacturing markets and continue to grow quite fast (see box 
2).  
 with abundant human resources (Minister Ma Kai, The People’s Republic 
f China (PRC), 2006). 
 
Box 2: Excerpt from Speech on the 11th Five-Year Plan by Minister Ma Kai 
“In the 11th Five-Year Program period, we will implement the strategy of rejuvenating our nation 
through science and education and take science and technology advancement and innovation as 
a major driving force of economic and social development.  We will give more strategic 
importance to developing education and fostering high-quality talented people who are endowed 
with capability and integrity, deepen system reforms, increase input, accelerate the development 
of science, technology and education, and make great efforts to build an innovation-oriented 
nation and strong nation
o
 
India has so far pursued domestic manufacturing behind (diminishing) protection, but not 
yet manufactured exports on a large scale.  The biggest economies benefit from trade, 
                                            
8 The picture is full of boat images; some current Chinese researchers ask whether ‘the boat will sink the 
water,’ the boat being a traditional image for the ship of state in China, and water a traditional image for the 
people. 
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but unlike the smaller open economies, they can achieve those important economies of 
scale and agglomeration to a substantial degree within their borders.  It is not clear to 
many people what India and Indian policy makers see as future comparative advantage, 
but services appear to be the biggest part of it.  An economist colleague and friend made 
the point that Bangladesh benefited a lot from the end of the global multi-fibre 
agreement, but India could have blown Bangladesh out of the water in textiles if its 
manufacturing sector had been more competitive.  It could become so - more bad news 
for the BB’s manufactured export prospects.  In agriculture, the government has also 
placed a new emphasis on the development of food chain infrastructure to kick start 
exports, double farm sector production, and create rural employment.  It however 
appears that India will be importing resources as well as more food and manufactured 
products than at present (manufactured products likely more from China than from 
elsewhere). 
s, along with ‘a hush all over China’ as students belted 
p for a week of national exams. 
 
What about the West?  Canada has comparative advantages at present in resources 
and in a large set of niche manufacturing, services and technology activities.  Canada 
could maintain these comparative advantages quite a while if it invested sufficiently and 
widely in education.  It is not doing that, particularly in secondary education where 
student performance is optional and violence is now an endemic problem.  We will pay a 
big price for this in the emerging global economy if we do not fix it fast.  The U.S. is in 
some ways in a similar position, and much more important to the global economy.  One 
prominent view is that more advanced economies maintain their comparative 
advantages in large part through moving upscale in technology and high-end 
manufacturing and services activities.  Given a head start, this strategy has some legs if 
education and research capabilities continue to grow.  Otherwise, we predictably will not 
compete with China and India, even in high-technologies.  News media recently reported 
violence in Canadian high school
u
 
Economists have long understood factor price equalization – the tendency for the wages 
of workers and the prices of other factors of production (capital, resources, 
knowledge/technology) to become equal in a global system of relatively free trade and 
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competition.  The easiest and perhaps only realistic path for this to happen is for 
everyone’s prosperity to grow, but for the prosperity of the poorer to grow (much) faster, 
and that is what is been happening with the advanced (OECD) countries growing at 
around 2% and the fast boaters and India at 5-10% or more.  ‘Comparative advantage’ 
says that everyone should benefit, including the less advanced and BB countries.  There 
should be other reasonably rapid boats, launched by this current round of globalization, 
which they can catch if their traps or serious problems do not prevent them from doing 
so.  It is likely that there will be further waves of footloose investment in labor intensive 
standard-technology manufacturing (toys, footwear, textiles and apparel) for countries 
that invest in primary education and seek foreign investment because labor costs are 
sing in the countries on the fast boats. 
.2-What about technology? 






Some argue that high technology is clearly not for the BB.  No and yes.  No, there are 
very pressing needs elsewhere, but yes, the impact of ICTs and other technologies in the 
BB is becoming significant.  The expansion of BoP goods and services markets is taking 
place in BB and OBB countries, in Africa in particular.  Uganda is among the leaders.  An 
often quoted case is that of Somaliland, North-Eastern Somalia, which has little of what 
you would call government and no regulation.  There is widespread use of mobile 
phones at prices (local and international) among the lowest in the world.  However, in 
Somaliland, there are five providers with no inter-connection, so you have to have five 




The critical importance of competition and good regulation in telecoms and the ICT 
sector is understood today, and there are stakeholder groups actively and successfully 
making improvements in many BB countries.  This took a while.  The World Bank (WB) 
and major donors pushed privatization of monopoly government telecoms heavily in the 
1990s, and got what they asked for; monopoly private telecoms.  Expansion of landlines 
halted, literally.  Mobile phone operators, however, avoided regulators and monopoly 
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long enough to have enough (three or more) service providers in an economy to ensure 
real competition.  Mobile use has expanded exponentially.  Good regulation achieves 
spectrum allocation, competition, interconnection, low cost of service and a society’s 
universal service objectives.  The WB and other donors were not the only ones to miss 
focusing on what was most needed, that is competition.  They were rather focused on 
the privatization ideology relative to research; not the Bank’s finest hour.  Sequencing is 
portant everywhere; more below.9  
 BoP – the few 
xceptions include Burma, Cambodia and countries which are in conflict. 
 technologies in the more advanced sectors of the economy 
nd countries of the world. 
                                           
im
 
What about biotechnologies, nanotechnologies and cognitive technologies?  Their rapid 
progress will be a prominent feature of the global economy, potentially very positive in 
terms of economic activity and human well-being - longer lives, better health, cheaper 
cleaner energy, cheaper food - but also with big ecosystem, biodiversity and security 
risks.  BB countries will benefit last, and incur high risks because of their weak regulatory 
systems – e.g. bio-safety for genetically modified crops.  A lot of effort is going into 
strengthening these capabilities.  Most BB countries are actively engaged with new 
technologies and innovation systems – including innovation in and for the
e
 
Knowledge is becoming a relatively larger factor of production in the global economy; this 
is hard to measure and prove, but accepted widely, with the implication that education, 
research and innovation systems are important pieces of the system-building that 
constitutes development.  Several major donors are providing more and better aid in this 
area and experience suggests it is especially needed and useful in BB and OBB 
countries, wherever there is not actually conflict or general failure.  Good foreign partners 
are important.  New technologies promise to fuel global economic growth and 
development, if managed well, but also to widen the gap between the BB countries and 
the rest in the coming decades.  A significant positive impact through ICT-related 
development at the BoP might reasonably be expected, and trickle-down from the growth 
impacts of ICTs and newer
a
 
9 To be fair, both privatization and greater competition were needed in many countries, and in some cases, 
experience shows that doing the privatization first was effective and arguably easier.  
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4.3-Global warming and global arrangements 
 high adaptation costs of global warming.  For them, there is no obvious 
pside.   
g environmental conservation and renewal costs, and poor countries would 
ain.10 
                                           
 
Global warming, unlike technology, is inherently a factor hindering economic 
development, and is going to impose structural adjustments on everyone - adaptation 
and mitigation - which is large by historical standards.  Advanced countries are better 
able to adjust, to adapt and to benefit from mitigation activities and new technology, 
particularly in energy and the underlying bio and nano technologies.  The BB countries 




As Prof. Collier has said on several occasions, the BB should not be asked to contribute 
to carbon reduction, having had a negligible part in global warming, and would have very 
little to contribute even if they were asked.  We could perhaps do even better.  A 
normative welfare economics solution, again borrowing from others, would be for all 
countries to agree on (declining) maximum carbon emission levels that have to be 
reached globally, year by year, to stop and reverse global warming - then assign these 
global quotas to countries on an agreed basis (like population) that favours poorer 
countries.  BB countries would get higher allocations than they needed, and could sell 




The amount of revenue received could be very large for BB countries, and the Dutch 
disease effects might need consideration.  The probability of such schemes being 
adopted in the current global political environment seems low, but no lower than 
dismantling Western agricultural protection or reducing global arms trade or having the 
 
10 The challenge is of course more complex.  For example, how effective are carbon credit arrangements 
among some countries, if broad global ones are infeasible?  How much could a carbon tax system 
accomplish, and what are the best particulars of carbon credit and tax options?  The work of the 
Commission on Growth and Development is developing some clear analyses in this area. 
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multinationals of Western and fast-boating countries all behave well in petroleum and 
resource industries.  One may hope that changes in countries like America could help 
make all the needed international charters and norms more feasible, but recent history is 
nly occasionally encouraging in this regard. 
nd resource imports as consumers 
ecome more prosperous and production expands. 
on indicated in The 
ottom Billion for countries with poorly functioning governments. 
-Suggestions and Questions 
o
 
What can realistically be asked and expected from China, India and the BB countries?  
Quite a bit!  China behaves very well in international institutions and arrangements; 
roughly as well as the United Kingdom (U.K.) and better than the U.S.  The examples of 
bad behaviour cited in The Bottom Billion are useful to monitor and discuss, as are those 
of the OECD countries.  Will China become more responsible much faster, historically, 
than the colonial powers did?  Again, maybe.  Chinese leaders are not at all unaware of 
the difficulties and risks of buying resources from BB countries, and Chinese decision 
making systems have been quite quick and successful - again by historical standards - in 
learning and adapting.  At the same time, both China and India are only part way through 
enormous changes which demand growing food a
b
 
These are reasonable and positive developments in any economic framework, and we 
might be able to help the BB more to benefit from them, as well as working to minimize 
the bad behaviour of China, India and our own countries.  Special assistance in linking 
BB producers with global (Western, Chinese, Indian, etc.) food and resource sectors 
might be very effective in reducing resource-trap behaviour on both sides of the table, as 
well as in terms of growth.  Funding could come from aid or carbon rights, if these were 






Following from the preceding discussion, this section summarizes suggestions for 
expanding analysis and extending proposals for changes in policy and practice in both 
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BB and more advanced countries.  Starting with some specific suggestions about 
international charters, the perspective then moves to sources and strategies of growth 
and development, as well as capabilities and freedoms. Finally, how to integrate growth 
nd development and international aid efforts are examined. 
.1-Charters 
and democracy - 
areas: 
t they need to be 
B countries in particular, and 
 countries in the WTO (not just 
 BB 
 stabilization and cooperation (especially for the Group 
of 8, China and India). 
and others; indeed, famines 





In addition to the suggestion of the Bottom Billion - for charters on natural resource 
revenue, budget transparency, post-conflict situations, investment 
there is arguably a need for charters or norms in the following 
• Global arms trade – it’s time. 
• Agricultural trade – the norms exist in the WTO, bu
implemented by (mainly) European countries and the U.S. 
• Carbon emissions – arrangements favouring B
less advanced developing countries in general. 
• Trade – serious preferential trade access for BB
with respect to their trade with Asian countries). 
• Access to technology and intellectual property - arrangements favouring
countries in particular, and less advanced developing countries in general. 
• Global macroeconomic
 
With respect to formulating charters and norms, it would be useful to see some 
assessment of human rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
now in its 60th year.  Prof. Collier finds that the relationship between political repression 
and the risk of civil war is weak and that ethnic strife is not demonstrably causal in civil 
strife either.  Conflict can rather be understood as problems arising from poverty (low 
income and slow growth), dependence on primary commodity exports (greed and self-
interest), and often donations from diaspora communities.  Hence, Collier’s analysis of 
conflict is not unlike the analysis of famines by Amartya Sen 
o
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The realities behind famine and natural resource revenue traps mean that an 
international agreement is needed on how to bring judgment and consequence to those 
who commit genocide, brutality and large scale robbery.  Genocide could be addressed 
in a charter for post-conflict situations.  Such a charter would also apply in conflict 
situations.  Hence, charters for both conflict and post-conflict situations could be 
considered, and perhaps connected with the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  The 
global system is currently struggling with these issues; people committing crimes against 
humanity have to know they will be tried, and punished if guilty.  The U.S. resists 
participating because it does not have to, at least yet, and does not want to be judged or 
constrained internationally.  Africa resists outside-judgement of its leaders for reasons 
that may be right in principle but can be fatally wrong in any given case.  Can Africa and 
the African Union participate effectively in the ICJ and in international mediation and 
peacekeeping?  Can China and India participate prominently?  What can be learned 
from the experience of the UDHR about design and implementation of international 
harters? 
e traps for decades, and their governments have either backed or not stopped 
the ? 
.2-Sources of Growth and Development 
promising are the other sources of growth and development and how are they best 
c
 
With respect to the proposed charter on natural resource revenue, an effective charter 
might indeed minimize rogue behaviour and integrate some BB countries into ‘formal’ 
international resource sectors – petroleum, minerals, precious minerals and timber.  
Could villains be brought to international justice courts, whether from South or North?  
China’s negative behaviour deserves comment, but should we not also be modest and 






The manufactured export boat is the fastest that this stage of globalization has to offer. 
However, for all the reasons the book documents, it may not be accessible for many BB 
countries any time soon.  All economic opportunities nevertheless matter.  How 
 
pursued by the BB countries and by practitioners of international development?  What 
follows is a list of themes and questions for analysis and further consideration. 
 
The Bottom of the Pyramid (BoP) 
 Understanding what is going on in the BoP and in BB countries, with the refocusing and 
redevelopment of business in the BoP, looks inexpensive and worthwhile.  Where are 
markets and services expanding quickly, and how big is the role of mobile phones, ICTs, 
and other factors?  What is the size of the BoP economy and how much economic 
opportunities would be realized if it grew at significant rates of about 5 or 10%?  What 
are ICTs, communications and networking contributing in terms of the capabilities of 
individuals, groups, systems and institutions?  How can policy and donors best help?   
 
Agriculture 
Many investment analysts and advisors are forecasting continuing rises in food and 
commodity prices, relative to manufactured goods for consumption.  Are they right?  
What do world food import demand projections look like with the growth of demand from 
China, India and the fast boaters?  What would they look like with a halving or an 
elimination of European and American agricultural protection and when might that 
happen?   Where might there be considerably more domestic food demand and demand 
growth if traps were to be escaped?  What kind of assistance would best help the BB’s 
food sectors to build the capabilities needed to process export and link into global food 
chains - and how can benefits to small scale producers and traders be raised in the 
process?  
 
In the first three years of its opening up in the early 1990s, Vietnam moved from being a 
rice importer to being the world’s third largest rice exporter.  Vietnam’s economic reforms 
facilitated a huge boost to the economy, and the country is now engaged in low-cost 
manufacturing production and export.  Was this just a special case – fast growing 
neighbours and pent-up savings freed by the change to private land ownership rights for 
farmers?  My personal experience suggests that there was more - to do with capabilities 
and institutions that were in place.  For example, Vietnam, like China, had a large and 
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To what extent can domestic demand and production growth be a significant and 
complementary source of growth?  How much potential is there in regional integration if it 
is not done behind high trade barriers, and how significant are the spin off benefits in 
capability and institutional development?  What can aid and other kinds of support help 
increasing growth and equity results in non-traded goods and services, and in regional 
integration? 
 
5.3-Strategies of Growth and Development 
 
Many use the words growth and development synonymously, and to me that is not 
wrong.  However, it is not close enough to the reality and needs a closer look.  It was not 
an accident that fast boats were built in Asia; the tigers and Thailand had been investing 
heavily in infrastructure, health and education for some decades.  Moreover, they had 
governments that were substantially more cohesive and better trained than in Africa.  
Vietnam’s successful leap into rice exports revealed what policy makers had rightly 
foreseen. Indeed, Vietnam’s capabilities in terms of farming, communities, state 
enterprises, scientific and research institutions, and governance were very advanced; 
and fairly quick to refocus from the centrally managed to the more market oriented 
mentality.  
 
Tanzania’s failure relative to China, as The Bottom Billion indicates, was perhaps 
influenced by (British) Marxists in some unfavourable ways.  However, that was not the 
main story.  In the early 1970s, I was one of the economists in the Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Development (MEPD) in Dar es Salaam who read the paper one morning 
to discover that the government had nationalized all buildings in the country.  The article 
mentioned that the MEDP had a plan for their management and maintenance, and we 
were all of course rounded up first thing that morning to construct the plan, by noon if 
possible.  Tanzanians quickly realized that no such plan was even hopefully feasible and 
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the nationalization project was reversed.  At that time, there was a lot of nation building 
going on in the capital and among the eighteen ethnic groups across the country.  Julius 
Nyerere, like his friend Pierre Trudeau, was not attracted to economics and this resulted 
in economic opportunities being lost in Tanzania.  However, the political and social 
building went well, unlike in Kenya and Uganda.   
 
Growth is essential to a development strategy as it literally pays for public services and 
investments in people and capital.  Public services in BB countries are indeed typically 
strapped for tax revenue and governments can not borrow beyond narrow limits without 
messing up the economy.  Particularly where the military takes a lot of the budget, there 
is very little money for infrastructure, security, health and education.  At the same time, 
growth does not come without these capacities being present and being developed.  
Catching a fast boat or, for most BB countries slower alternative boats, will require 
aggressive resource-constrained, and therefore ‘efficient’, human and system capability 
building. 
 
During the early 1990s, I lived in Jiangsu in China, a prosperous province on the Yangtze 
River.  Surprisingly, only one out of twenty township and village enterprises that I visited 
in the Nanjing area was at that time export oriented. This enterprise was exporting 
designer jeans to Germany, with German investment.  Most village enterprises were 
assisted by urban state enterprises or by their retired people who had experience.  Some 
enterprises were in the second and third generation of trying to profitably produce a 
good, failing and trying again.  There were some 12,000 research institutions at the 
national, provincial and local levels, and scores of universities across China.  These 
research institutions had come a long way in 20 years since the end of the Cultural 
Revolution in 1976, but they had built on institutions that had survived.  The party and 
country had learned from the Cultural Revolution and the succession of the Kuomintang 
in Taiwan that legitimacy could be maintained only by delivering on development.  In 
comparison with China, Tanzania’s experience in the 1970s was not different mainly 
because of the persistence of socialism, or by its small size, but much more by its much 
lower initial level of human, institutional and political development. 
 
IDRC GGP Working Paper Series    I 32  I     Paper#5: Randy Spence 
 
 
IDRC GGP Working Paper Series    I 33  I     Paper#5: Randy Spence 
 
If one agrees with the importance of capability building in development, some further 
considerations need to be taken into account: 
 
• Sequencing is very important.  A country should be as liberal as possible in terms 
of economic policy to take advantage of its economic opportunities, but it is not 
just ‘open the floodgates and let her role’.  Important lessons have been learned 
in trade and financial sectors; countries typically have to do some serious building 
of capabilities before or along with liberalizations to achieve potential benefits.  
Achieving real competition, with consequent opportunities for all prospective 
market participants, is one key ingredient. 
 
• Lessons have been learned at many levels, notably in trade and financial sector 
policy, but also in other sectors.  Neoliberal economics pushed the privatization of 
the state sugar monopoly in Mauritius.  Private monopoly power resulted with no 
benefit to producers and net job loss.  The intent was right, but the capacity was 
not there to ensure competition in production, marketing and export.  As with 
telecoms, privatization would have gone much better and quicker with serious 
attention to competition policy, but both domestic and foreign monopoly interests 
were hostile to that, and the International Financial Institutions (IFI) did not or 
could not push it too far in the face of opposition from their controlling member 
countries.   
 
• Education and health services expenditures should grow roughly11 at the pace of 
market growth.  Hence, there is a strong case for consistent and better aid to 
education and health – not only in terms of money, but also in terms of the 
relationships among institutions in more advanced and BB countries.  Donors 
were building universities and both primary and secondary education capacities 
in the early years of foreign aid.  They drifted off into basic needs, policy reform, 
                                            
11 For some people, this may revive memories of balanced and unbalanced growth discussions; some 
imbalances can clearly be highly positive in terms of dynamics.  The dimension that has been added here 
is the broader idea of societies building their capabilities, with no single model of the end result or the 
process.  The most promising imbalances have to be identified, tried and adapted.  Conceptual 
frameworks are invaluable, but country-specific considerations must often dominate. 
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poverty reduction and a succession of smaller intervening trends.  It is hard to 
imagine African countries escaping BB traps without better health and good 
schools - and fairly easy to imagine it with these.   
 
• BB countries and their donors might usefully give more thought to knowledge and 
experience in the area of building capabilities and capacities, including social 
choice, social justice, the capability approach in economics and a lot of political 
and other social sciences.  Welfare economics and economists, particularly the 
more neoliberal or neo-conservative,12 might be much more effective if they 
worked with thinkers and practitioners from a broader range of fields.  
Interdisciplinarity has a very good reputation in applied development research 
and policy analysis, for good reasons, as it is often indispensable in solving 
problems. 
 
5.4-Capabilities and Freedoms 
 
Amartya Sen and a rapidly growing human development constituency regard human 
development as the primary focus or objective of development.  This consists in 
increasing the capabilities and freedoms of individuals and groups – economic, political, 
social, ethical and security freedoms as described in Sen’s Development as Freedom.  
The objective of human development incorporates economic growth, equity and 
sustainability - human development clearly means development for everyone, and equal 
or better opportunities for future generations mean environmental conservation and 
renewal.  The conceptual framework of the capability approach encompasses economic 
growth and the tools of welfare economics.  The framework also includes knowledge and 
practice of how societies can best make social choices, achieve social justice and 
organize / optimize public services provision.  The framework takes into account the 
several dimensions of well-being, beyond material well-being, that people highly value, 
                                            
12 In the history of economic thought, small “l” liberal is not too different from large “C” Conservative – 
‘liberalized’ economic policy and conservative social policy.  Large “L” Liberal, as for example in the 
Canadian Liberal Party, carries the meaning of ‘liberalized’ economic policy but liberal (more focus on 
equity) social policy. 
 
but that do not come automatically or necessarily with material growth - and the 
consequent need to target these dimensions in public policy and action - notably 
security, dignity and empowerment. 
 
This approach also points out the instrumental as well as intrinsic value of investments 
like health and education, in enabling market growth while building capabilities.  Many 
welfare economists – my background - resist.  ‘It is too complicated; policy makers will 
lose focus with multiple goals – look at their performance with only one.’  There is some 
truth to this, and efficiency/growth will remain central.  Welfare economics has introduced 
a lot of needed discipline into policy discussion and global thinking.  Without it, people 
can say almost anything, and do.  However, my experience says more.  A big number 
and range of people in developing countries explicitly want other freedoms too.  The 
majority of civil servants in Uganda or Laos, who are not corrupt, want decent quality of 
life as much as those in the U.K. or Canada, and have little problem in practical terms - 
from my experience - dealing with multiple objectives.  They are very often highly 
motivated and able to do so.   
 
People in developed countries are not that different – insecurity, indignity and 
disempowerment are growing problems.  Integrating paradigms is never easy, but many 
advanced countries do integrate human development and economic growth effectively.  
One approach is to think rather separately about material well-being and markets on one 
side, and about collectively produced and consumed services and non-material 
freedoms on the other side.  This works reasonably well in the short run, and there is 
definite progress in synthesizing and integrating different conceptual frameworks in terms 
of theory and policy in light of practice and experience.  However, quicker progress 
would be more ‘efficient’. 
 
In the mid-1960s and early 1970s, the dominant economics and public finance textbooks 
listed efficiency, equity, stabilization and participation as the four fundamental goals of 
economics.  This was before the full impact of ‘The Road to Serfdom’ and Hayek’s 
backers, before much of the economics profession went rather obsessively for efficiency 
and growth for the next three decades or so.  One hears that ‘growth is back’, in the U.K. 
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Department for International Development (DFID) and the U.K. Government.  The truth is 
that it never went away; market growth and liberalization has been the dominant 
economic paradigm in international institutions and relations since the mid-1970s. 
 
5.5-Integrating Growth and Development 
 
The first IMF team to visit Uganda in 1986 stayed in the country for two days.  The 
Ugandans had prepared their own policy package, and asked why the IMF team did not 
stay longer to discuss and resolve.  A young member of the IMF team replied that they 
did not want to risk becoming sympathetic.  At one level, this was quite reasonable, and 
everyone saw that.  They were there to lay down a few rules concerning the size of the 
government budget in relation to GDP and the size of foreign borrowing.  International 
experience was pretty clear and local detail somewhat irrelevant.  However, at another 
level, everyone else in the room knew there was something badly wrong with the picture. 
 
The IMF and the WB provoked a lot of the critics that they encountered.  Approaches did 
not need to be so one-dimensional and top-down.  There was little serious thought about 
capacity building until the 1990s.  But these were clever people, so one had to believe 
that they saw globalization and economic development differently than most others.  
Their opponents stressed the darker and nastier sides of globalization – arms 
everywhere, the behaviour of Western multinationals in resource industries, the 
compliance by commission or omission of their governments, the use of military force to 
support tyrants and thugs over democrats, the unwillingness and inability of the 
international and bilateral donor agencies to deviate a lot from the neoliberal line.   
 
At the same time, the Washington Consensus saw more clearly than their opponents the 
importance of efficient resource allocation, markets, productivity and economic growth – 
and although influenced and generally controlled by their political masters, their 
economists at least had a framework that is right-headed when it is not abused or 
pursued in fundamentalist or ideological ways.  There is in fact a huge amount in welfare 
economics that is invaluable for pursuing inclusive growth, equity, stabilization, 
participation and poverty reduction.  It is past time, one might argue, to stop fighting and 
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put human development and welfare economics together.  While somewhat complex, 
this is not so daunting; students increasingly get it and vote with their feet.  Globalization 
brings tension and volatility along with the growth kick, and there are enough other areas 
of conflict among regions, nations, religions and others to be able to afford a wasteful 
conflict over growth and capability development.  It is not one or the other, it is clearly 
both. 
 
In one perspective, global growth has been pushed quite single-mindedly for three 
decades and has been achieved in large measure.  Very little explicit attention was given 
to security and environment, and that was successful too – conflict and increasingly 
disastrous environmental destruction were the results.  Beware of what you do not 
ask.  Recent research on happiness13 indicates that it has remained static or has 
declined in wealthy countries over the past 50 years in spite of enormous growth in per 
capita incomes.  Beware of what you ask.  Depression and crime are large and growing 
problems.  Some of the ways in which we pursue growth are responsible for the static 
and declining happiness observed.  The countries that have asked for both human 
development and growth14 have also generally succeeded - Holland, Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, Switzerland, New Zealand, Australia, Canada and others.  It is known to be 
possible because it has been done.  Ask for the right things.  We seem to be very 
timid, both about setting development objectives and about collecting the data needed to 
monitor their achievement and guide policy.   
 
Along with putting the missing dimensions of well-being into the objectives set, they need 
also to be put into data collection systems and general awareness.  Some of this is 
happening in many specific initiatives and an important OECD programme is sponsoring 
the bringing together of datasets - with advanced comparison, analysis and presentation 
                                            
13 Happiness: Lessons from a new Science by Richard Layard provides a very good introduction to literature 
on happiness and development. 
14 In Layard’s book, the ‘big seven’ factors contributing to happiness are family relationships, financial 
situation (especially security), work (especially security), community and friends, health, personal freedom 
and personal values. 
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capabilities.15  Support for data development is important to people within countries and 
important to the international system, which is under constant and growing pressure to 
provide global public goods.  To keep doing better will require more extensive data on 
people and non-market activity along with national accounts and market data. 
 
The Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) has developed and is 
piloting measures of security, dignity, empowerment and employment quality for use in 
many current international datasets, including the World Bank Living Standards and 
Measurement Survey (LSMS), the World Bank Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire 
(CWIQ), Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), the UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster 
Survey (MICS) and the International Household Survey Network (IHSN).  A pilot project 
is beginning with the international Community Based Monitoring Systems Network 
(CBMS).  There are dozens of other valuable data initiatives.  Some produce institutional 
and policy assessment data like the World Bank initiative on governance indicators, 
described and used by Prof. Collier, or the Telecom Regulatory Environment measures 
and processes developed by LIRNEasia and its sister networks. 
 
An interesting hypothesis is that individual, group, system and institutional capabilities 
increasingly reside in, and are reinforced by, networks.16 Capability development is 
noticeably changing and speeding up with the networking power and mathematics of 
electronic communications.  It is less visible in the BB countries, but it is there.  For 
instance, mobile phones are helping to build both economic activity and personal security 
in poor communities.  
 
5.6-What about aid? 
 
Prof. Collier makes significant recommendations for improving the design and delivery of 
aid and technical assistance to suit the needs of countries in different trap configurations.  
                                            
15 OECD, Measuring the Progress of Societies: World Forum on Statistics, Knowledge and Policy, (available 
at http://www.oecd.org/site/0,3407,en_21571361_31938349_1_1_1_1_1,00.html) 
16 James Foster - who economists will know from, among other things, the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke 
(FGT) poverty measures – has added an analysis of external capabilities and ICTs.  
 
At the same time, as he indicates, there is Dutch disease, and aid has diminishing 
returns, so there are limits.  One might add: 
 
• Special assistance appears necessary in BB countries to build sectoral capability 
to export, wherever comparative advantage lies, and link with foreign companies 
and markets.  There is a lot of experience available to draw on here, on better 
and worse ways to do this in agriculture and horticulture for example, and in the 
other main resource sectors.  We seem much less confident about helping build 
capacity for manufactured exports in the BB, perhaps because these sectors are 
typically starting from scratch rather than from an existing production base. 
• Consistent long term effort is needed in education and health.  In addition, 
sufficient attention to research and innovation systems, including the expansion 
of innovation going on in the BoP – particularly in agriculture, food processing, 
and development of informal enterprises and services – and in ICT network 
development, along with other infrastructures. 
• A closer look at aid is useful in terms of net resource transfers.  Studies over the 
past three decades show that if you discount aid flows by the large amount that is 
military, the repayment cost of loans, the efficiency costs of tied aid and a couple 
of smaller factors, then the net resource transfer is 1/4 to 1/3 of the total flow.  Aid 
is also a dysfunctional business in a lot of ways described by Prof. Collier and 
others.  However, at 1/4 to 1/3 of nominal value, it is not clear that aid has ever 
been tried seriously enough to conclude much about diminishing returns, or 
whether the capacity constraints to achieving constant or increasing returns can 
not themselves be reduced by persistent effort. 
• Few donors take capacity building seriously.  Prof. Collier’s points about technical 
assistance on a broad and sustained basis are good ones, for example, but this 
will do little good if the foreign advisors do the work rather than assist the 
domestic people and institutions.  Capacity building is not an afterthought; the 
resources have to be included in aid projects and programs.  A shift in donor 
attitudes to recipients is needed in many cases, with less condescension and 
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more genuine collaboration, and there are very few kinds of aid worth doing if 
capacity development is not one of the main components. 
• The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of March 2005, endorsed by over 100 
donor and recipient countries, provides important commitments and monitoring 
mechanisms for improving aid alignment, coordination, management and 
accountability, while building the capabilities of recipient countries.  It surely 




6-Conclusion: Is this All Quite Naïve? 
 
In terms of global politics and the will of the more developed and rapidly developing 
countries, ‘overly optimistic’ is a kinder term for what The Bottom Billion, in all of the 
book’s recommendations, asks of the West, China, India, other Asian countries and 
companies - compared to what they have so far been willing to do.   More resolve will be 
needed in the Top Billion countries, and there are some encouraging signs.  The 
paragraph which appears alone on the cover of the recent white paper on Irish aid, for 
example, does not explain how to do it, but it is not a bad start (see box 3).    
Box 3: Excerpt from White Paper on Irish Aid 
“First and foremost, we give aid because it is right that we help those in greatest need. We are bound 
together by more than globalisation.  We are bound together by a shared humanity.  The fate of others is a 
matter of concern to us.  From this shared humanity comes a responsibility to those in great need beyond the 
borders of our own state.  For some, political and strategic motives may influence decisions on the allocation 
of development assistance.  That is not the case for Ireland.  For Ireland, the provision of assistance and our 
cooperation with developing countries is a reflection of our responsibility to others and of our vision of a fair 
global society.” (Government of Ireland, 2006) 
 
 
The world economy is changing quickly, calling for new thinking and policy on 
commercial, military, donor and other kinds of interactions.  Awareness and concern will 
grow in Western countries as they become less dominant.  The Bottom Billion is 
convincing on why we should care about these countries and their people.  Media 
coverage and interest should improve, and growing communications at all levels with BB 
IDRC GGP Working Paper Series    I 40  I     Paper#5: Randy Spence 
 
 
countries and people will happen.  There are some grounds for being optimistic.  The 
Bottom Billion brings important new insights and prompts us to re-examine all our 
assumptions.  The learning can be nothing but good.   
 
However, as I re-examine my own assumptions and experience, I find some substantial 
differences with the narrative of The Bottom Billion: 
• The world’s poorest people live in countries that are trapped in ways described in 
the book, but they also live trapped in similar ways within countries that are now 
doing better.  Development is the building of what societies can do; the 
capabilities of individuals and institutions, and the well-being that people 
consequently experience.  Some of this building takes the form of increased 
production and consumption of goods and services – both market and public – 
and is measured as economic growth.  Some takes other forms – the generation 
of other freedoms and forms of well-being that are only starting to be consistently 
measured. 
• Economic growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for development, 
increased equity and reduced poverty.  Most economists accept this, but the 
almost exclusive focus on fast market growth and liberalization of the past three 
decades has generated negative consequences of many varieties – notably weak 
public services and sectors, large scale environmental damage, and failure to 
achieve non-material dimensions of well-being, including security, dignity and 
empowerment.  Some of these negative consequences have undermined growth 
and development prospects, particularly in the least advanced countries.  
Countries that have taken a more balanced approach over time have done 
measurably better in terms of material and non-material well-being. 
• There are different strategies to achieve sustained economic growth.  In addition 
to the fast boat of manufactured exports, these include development of 
manufacturing production for domestic consumption and of agriculture, natural 
resources and services for both domestic consumption and export.  Countries 
have succeeded in these strategies, and all opportunities are important – 
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particularly for the poorest.  Expansion of goods, services and innovation in the 
BoP deserves particular attention and policy reinforcement. 
 
Moving beyond economic growth to development will require conceptual frameworks that 
go much further than welfare economics, particularly the neoliberal version.  Important 
approaches can be found in the human development and capability framework, in areas 
including institutional and behavioural economics, and elsewhere.  It is more important 
for societies to be moving in the right direction than to be getting there fast.  Will the 
dominant neoliberal paradigm recognize its flaws and work with other essential 
approaches?  Most current evidence says ‘not very soon’.  The page will turn eventually, 
when global problems get sufficiently large and clear.  In the interim, there will be a lot of 
patient work, a lot of villains who thrive in the North and South with the backing or 
disregard of the major powers, and a growing tendency to discard the useful and 
important elements of welfare economics instead of using them for the creation of 
broader and more effective understanding and practice. 
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AERC African Economic Research Consortium 
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CWIQ Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire 
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DFID Department for International Development 
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OBB Other Bottom Billion 
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UN United Nations 
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